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ABSTRACT
Brexit has been a major crisis facing the European integration process. The paper examines how Brexit was 
framed and exploited by two EU member state governments, Czechia and Hungary. We conceptualize Brexit 
as a “distant crisis” for these two countries: although it is likely to have significant impacts, these are uncertain 
and not immediate. Building on the crisis-framing literature, we apply frame analysis to examine governmental 
rhetoric and find that both governments have instrumentalized Brexit for internal purposes by pragmatically 
adapting their discursive positions on it to fit their political calculus on both domestic and European issues.
Introduction
There has been a profound sense of crisis in the European 
Union (EU) for more than a decade (Dinan, Nugent, and 
Paterson 2017). The global economic crisis, the Eurozone 
crises, the rise of populism and illiberalism, the refugee crisis, 
and most recently, Brexit, have all contributed to perceptions 
that the integration process is under significant stress 
(Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015; Rosamond 2016). However, 
crisis events create not only threats for policy actors, but also 
opportunities. According to Boin, ’t Hart, and McConnell 
(2008, 285), a crisis “opens up semantic and political space 
for actors to redefine issues, propose new policies, foster public 
reflection, or simply to gain popularity and strike at oppo-
nents.” Government actors will use a number of rhetorical 
devices to frame a crisis in ways that deflect potential blame 
from themselves or build public support for specific policies, 
with the ultimate goal of improving their chances of reelection. 
Crises allow governments to push certain agendas, under the 
pretext that “business as usual” can no longer be sustained 
(Boin et al. 2009). Exploiting the crisis for their own ends is 
thus a key concern for governments.
Most of the literature on crisis framing focuses on crises that 
have immediate and tangible impacts requiring urgent action, 
such as the 2008 global financial crisis (Masters and ’t Hart 
2012; McCann 2013), natural disasters (De Vries 2004), or 
man-made catastrophes (Wagner-Pacifici 1994). There have 
also been a number of contributions focusing on long-term 
“simmering” crises, most notably the difficulties of funding 
welfare states, or climate change (Rosenthal, Boin, and 
Comfort 2001; Vasilescu 2007). The literature, however, 
seems to have neglected a third type of crisis, which we term 
“distant crisis.” Distant crises originate from outside of the 
country, and while their effects are potentially large, these are 
generally not immediately apparent. As opposed to simmering 
crises, which may only impact future generations, a distant 
crisis has relatively more immediate effects, thus carrying 
a greater sense of urgency. For example, Western European 
states may perceive the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
resulting conflict as a distant crisis, at least when it comes to 
how it impacts their internal affairs. A distant crisis provides 
governments with different framing and crisis-exploitation 
possibilities than the more “immediate” crises do, and these 
differences are not well understood in the literature.
In order to examine how EU actors frame and exploit 
distant crises, the paper compares how Brexit has entered the 
rhetoric of political actors in the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Brexit has been widely perceived as one of the most important 
crises facing the European integration process (Caporaso 2018; 
Menon and Salter 2016; Rosamond 2016), and one of the key 
topics on the EU’s agenda since the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
electorate voted to leave the bloc on June 23, 2016. Brexit is 
a major crisis for the EU not only because the UK is the first 
member state seeking to leave the Union, but also because it “is 
a large and powerful Member State whose withdrawal will have 
damaging political and economic implications” (Nugent 2018, 
54). Despite this, the crisis is distant for many smaller member 
states, especially ones in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); 
due to the uncertainties of the Brexit process and the difficul-
ties in forming a political consensus in the UK on the exact 
form of Brexit, its economic, political, and security-related 
impacts have been unclear, and in many cases indirect. 
Furthermore, these impacts are not immediate, as a lengthy 
negotiation process followed the referendum, and the UK 
failed to leave the EU on the original Brexit date of March 29, 
2019.
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The paper develops a framework to understand how poli-
tical actors may frame a distant crisis like Brexit, using insights 
from the crisis-framing and -exploitation literatures (e.g. Boin, 
’t Hart, and McConnell 2008; Boin et al. 2009; de Vries 2004; 
Masters and ’t Hart 2012). The actual frames used by Czech 
and Hungarian politicians are identified using a qualitative 
dataset composed of policymaking documents and speeches/ 
statements/interviews between the Brexit referendum in 
June 2016 and the finalization of the withdrawal agreement in 
November 2018. The primary focus is on framings of govern-
ment actors, but opposition framings are also included as 
contrast to these. The main results indicate that both govern-
ments mainly used Brexit to portray themselves as well- 
prepared, determined defenders of the national interest. They 
also framed Brexit to apportion blame on the EU, and Hungary 
even used it instrumentally to attack the EU on its perceived 
failings in other areas, such as its management of the refugee 
crisis. Despite the criticism and vague calls for EU reform, 
neither country seized the opportunity to put forward con-
structive proposals, and indeed both seemed intent on guard-
ing the status quo.
These results contribute to the literature on EU member 
states’ policymaking with respect to Brexit (and the EU more 
generally). With Brexit constituting “a two-way process invol-
ving 27 other member states” (Oliver 2016), it is essential to 
know how the UK’s partners have been approaching it. While 
this area has been a compelling focus for scholarly attention 
(Brusenbauch Meislová 2020; Szent-Iványi 2018; Turner et al. 
2018; Usherwood and Kassim 2018), there has been compara-
tively little detailed academic analysis on the Brexit policies of 
CEE states. Thus, by examining the Czech and Hungarian fram-
ing of Brexit, this article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the 
topic. Furthermore, the research also matters in wider theoretical 
and empirical terms. Brexit carries implications for the EU27 
and for the future of the EU itself, and thus shapes the EU 
policies of member states. Understanding the member-state- 
level discourses that come out of, and are related to, Brexit and 
how it (co-)forms wider narratives on the EU is therefore of 
special importance. More broadly, with member states’ stances 
on Brexit closely related to national policy preferences toward 
the EU, the research sheds further light on the nature of these 
preferences and their formation in a CEE context (Copsey and 
Haughton 2009; Haughton and Malova 2007), as well as the 
behavior of these countries within the multi-level governance 
system of the EU polity, which has long been ambiguous (Nič 
2016). By shaping public opinion on Brexit as an EU crisis, 
national political actors also signal their positions on the EU to 
their supporters, who then “use these signals as information 
shortcuts” for how they perceive, locate, and identify with the 
EU (Schlipphak and Treib 2017, 3).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents 
the paper’s theoretical framework, focusing on crisis framing in 
the case of distant crises. This is followed by a discussion of the 
political contexts in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and the 
rationale for selecting these two countries for comparison. The 
subsequent section presents the data and methods used in the 
paper, followed by the empirical findings. The final section 
provides concluding remarks.
Crisis Framing and Distant Crises
According to Robert M. Entman (1993), framing is defined as 
selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpreta-
tion, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for 
the item described.” The key idea is that the reaction to an 
event is determined not by the event itself, but by the way in 
which such events are interpreted and given meaning (De Vries 
2004, 596–97). Frames help in defining problems, identifying 
causes, passing judgment, apportioning blame, and suggesting 
remedies (Kuypers 2009, 182). Framing as an act of political 
communication and rhetoric is therefore possibly the most 
cost-effective tool political actors have to influence public- 
policy processes (Jacoby 2000). Rational government actors 
will use frames with the view of advancing their own goals, 
which ultimately relate to ensuring reelection. Politicians gen-
erally spend “considerable time determining the frames most 
advantageous to them” (Klar, Robinson, and Druckam 2012, 5) 
and ensuring that their favored interpretations of complex 
social phenomena prevail (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 74).
A significant literature has emerged on how governments 
frame major political events, with a specific focus on crises, 
defined as events that have strong and tangible impacts on 
society and require immediate action (see Boin, ’t Hart, and 
McConnell 2008; Boin et al. 2009; de Vries 2004; Masters and 
’t Hart 2012; or McCann 2013). Crises provide windows of 
opportunity for governments to push a specific agenda or policy 
reform. The paper adapts Arjen Boin et al.’s (2009) framework 
for interpreting how political actors make use of these windows 
of opportunity. Boin et al. (2009, 83) term these actions “crisis 
exploitation,” referring to the ways crisis rhetoric is used to alter 
support for public office holders or for specific policies. Political 
actors can frame a crisis event with a view to apportioning blame 
(deflecting it from themselves or placing it on opponents), and 
use the sense of urgency caused by the crisis to advocate for 
a change in the status quo. Boin et al. (2009) identify three broad 
possible framing strategies for political actors. First, they can 
deny the crisis, playing down the relevance of the events and 
arguing that no one is to blame. Second, the crisis may be framed 
as a threat: the government will aim to deflect blame, but will 
otherwise argue for maintaining business as usual. Finally, the 
crisis can also be presented as an opportunity, allowing govern-
ments to argue for change, and focus blame on dysfunctional 
policies or political opponents.
The crisis-exploitation framework was developed based on 
government framings of urgent events with high impacts. We 
extend this framework to cover events that we term “distant 
crises.” A distant crisis has two key features that differentiate 
it from the kinds of crises covered by Boin et al. (2009): first, 
its origins are external to the country, and second, while it 
clearly has domestic impacts, these are uncertain, indirect, 
and not immediate. Brexit constitutes such a distant crisis for 
the CEE countries. It originates externally from their geo-
graphic region, and while it does threaten material wellbeing 
within the region through its impacts on trade, investment, 
and the flow of people, the magnitude of these is uncertain. 
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The populations of the CEE countries are unlikely to have 
strong understandings of how Brexit will impact their daily 
lives. The fact that the UK was still an EU member more than 
three years after the 2016 referendum also mitigated any sense 
of urgency.
We argue that a distant crisis leads to different framing 
opportunities for political actors as opposed to the ones gen-
erally featured in the literature. We identify three ways in 
which the distant nature of a crisis may have an impact on 
the possibilities political elites have to frame it for domestic 
audiences. We discuss these below, formulating specific expec-
tations on how these may play out in the way Brexit is framed 
by the Czech and Hungarian governments.
First, since Brexit originates from outside of their polities 
and its actual threat level is unclear, it is unlikely that either 
government would need to use frames that deflect blame from 
themselves. Government policies did not cause the crisis; the 
only potential criticism toward governments would relate to 
whether they were well prepared for the crisis, and how they 
are reacting to it. Governments will therefore aim to portray 
themselves as having clear ideas on how to manage any domes-
tic fallout, and taking the appropriate actions. We expect both 
the Czech and Hungarian governments to use framings of 
Brexit that show them as prepared, knowledgeable, and ready 
to engage. They will portray themselves as ready to defend the 
national interest and as capable negotiators who will do what 
they can to ensure that the final outcome of the Brexit negotia-
tions fits with these interests. These framings of Brexit may be 
especially important for domestic purposes. While opposition 
politicians cannot blame the government for Brexit, they can 
attack it for not responding appropriately. This may further 
induce the government to frame Brexit in ways that highlight 
its competence in managing the impacts. Brexit can be an 
opportunity for the government to communicate its prowess 
to domestic audiences with relatively little risk, given how the 
outcome does not really depend on government actions.
Second, governments may use a distant crisis to apportion 
blame on adversaries. In the case of Brexit, apportioning blame 
on the domestic opposition is nonsensical for CEE governments, 
but there may be external adversaries. Hungary’s government 
has had an especially contentious relationship with the European 
Commission (EC) and other EU institutions since 2010, and has 
repeatedly portrayed the country as being “under attack from 
Brussels” (Bozóki and Hegedűs 2018). Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect blame apportioning toward the EU. While successive 
Czech governments have also shown degrees of 
Euroskepticism, their relations with the EU have generally 
been much smoother than Hungary’s, making blame apportion-
ing toward the EU less likely. We therefore expect the Hungarian 
government especially to use Brexit instrumentally and to frame 
it as an argument in its broader criticism of the EU.
Third, given that the roots of a distant crisis are independent 
from domestic policies, and perceived levels of threat are lower, 
governments have less scope to argue for changing the domes-
tic status quo. The Czech Republic and Hungary could frame 
Brexit to argue for maintaining “business as usual” on the EU 
level as well. In the past, both countries have resisted EU 
reforms that would have decreased the relative influence of 
member states vis-à-vis supranational bodies (Dostál and 
Végh 2017). They may see their position on these matters 
weakened with the departure of the UK, which they perceived 
as an ally (Szent-Iványi 2018). Furthermore, both countries are 
beneficiaries of EU funding. Therefore, we expect both govern-
ments to frame Brexit as a threat to their beneficial situation 
within the EU, as opposed to an opportunity for EU reform. 
The Hungarian government may be more likely to use such 
framings due to its greater dependence on EU funding 
(Keszthelyi 2017).
These three expectations illustrate that the ways in which 
governments may exploit a distant crisis like Brexit are heavily 
shaped by their preferences with respect to the EU, and these 
discursive exercises can be seen as parts of the national EU 
preference-formation process. In other words, framing, as an 
act of including and emphasizing on the one hand, and exclud-
ing on the other, is a way to strategically communicate these 
preferences. Existing scholarship has shown that preference 
formation is a complex process, and no single factor can 
explain CEE preferences vis-à-vis EU politics (Copsey and 
Haughton 2009; Haughton and Malova 2007). Distant crises 
such as Brexit can impact the process of preference formation 
by shifting national (material) interests, but the way govern-
ments frame Brexit can also be indicative of their existing 
preferences.
Brexit and Political Contexts in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary
Following the referendum in June 2016, the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU began on March 29, 2017, when Prime Minister 
(PM) Theresa May invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). The European Council adopted a joint negotiat-
ing position in April 2017, and the negotiations were led by the 
EC, represented by Michel Barnier. In December 2017, a Joint 
Report was published setting out the areas of agreement between 
the two sides, focusing on protecting the rights of EU citizens in 
the UK and UK citizens in the EU, the Northern Irish border, 
and the financial settlement. The negotiations continued 
throughout 2018. The Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration on the future UK–EU relationship were endorsed 
at a meeting of the European Council in November 2018. The 
negotiations have been dubbed as “the world’s most complex 
divorce” (Barker 2016; for more details, see Bulmer and Quaglia 
2018 or Turner et al. 2018).
Examining how EU member states framed Brexit during 
this process can support a deeper understanding of how the 
negotiations evolved. Selecting the Czech Republic and 
Hungary as case studies for this has been driven by a most- 
similar-cases design. Both are CEE, former communist, mid- 
sized EU member states with similar population levels. Both 
joined the EU in 2004, but have not joined the Eurozone. Both 
have an ambiguous relationship with the EU: while they are 
dependent on the Union, their governments criticize it exten-
sively, albeit to varying degrees. Furthermore, neither country’s 
relationship with the UK stands out in any way: they both have 
extensive trade and investment relationships with the UK (see 
Table 1), but Britain is not a key economic partner for either 
country. Even though the UK was the fourth largest export 
market for the Czech Republic in 2016, the value of exports to 
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Germany was five times greater than those to the UK (and 
seven times higher for Hungary). Therefore, while both coun-
tries have interests in maintaining frictionless trade with 
Britain, their ties with Germany are generally more important. 
Finally, both countries have significant expatriate populations 
living in the UK, although these numbers are higher for 
Hungary.
The Czech Republic and Hungary are perhaps the “most 
similar” countries from the region in terms of their potential 
positions toward Brexit. Poland and Romania have signifi-
cantly larger expatriate populations in the UK, and Poland, 
together with the Baltic countries, is also more preoccupied 
with security concerns and ensuring the UK’s continued com-
mitment to NATO. Slovakia, due to its membership in the 
Eurozone and lack of any strong or visible confrontation with 
the EU, also represents a very different set of circumstances 
(Szent-Iványi 2018).
The key source of variation between Hungary and the Czech 
Republic in terms of framing Brexit is linked to the differences 
in their domestic politics, especially how they instrumentalize 
the EU for domestic purposes.
In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party came to power 
after a landslide victory in the 2010 general elections, and 
achieved similar successes in 2014 and 2018 as well. 
Constitutional majorities in the parliament, as well as 
a fragmented opposition, have allowed Fidesz to gradually 
dismantle democratic institutions (Kornai 2015), turning 
Hungary into the EU’s first “illiberal” democracy (Ágh 2016; 
Bozóki and Hegedűs 2018). Fidesz’s ideology has been char-
acterized as a mix between paternalist populism and illiberal 
elitism (Enyedi 2016), and its rhetoric as aggressive conserva-
tive nationalism. Protecting the nation against malicious forces 
has been a key part of the party’s rhetoric. Fidesz has success-
fully externalized this “them vs. us” rhetoric, shifting the focus 
to external sources of threat (Hegedűs 2019), and has portrayed 
itself as the only actor capable of protecting the nation. 
“Brussels” has frequently been framed as one of these threats. 
EU institutions have been highly critical of the Hungarian 
government’s de-democratization measures, leading to fre-
quent political clashes. These culminated in 2018 with the EU 
launching TEU Article 7 proceedings against Hungary 
(Politico 2018). The anti-EU rhetoric is in sharp contrast to 
the fact that Hungary is heavily dependent on the EU: funding 
from the EU was the main source of growth between 2007 and 
2013 (KPMG 2017).
After the European refugee crisis in 2015, the government’s 
focus shifted toward “illegal migrants” as a new source of 
external threat (Tétényi, Barczikay, and Szent-Iványi 2019). 
Hungary refused to accept refugees under the EU’s reallocation 
scheme, and the government organized a referendum against it 
in 2016. The government used the refugee crisis to paint itself 
as a protector not only of Hungary, but of the entire “European 
Christian civilization” (Thorleifsson 2017).
This narrative of exceptionalism has been reinforced by 
Orbán’s rhetoric, as he portrays himself as a leader of a Europe- 
wide nationalist-populist revolt against the EU. The govern-
ment has shifted the domestic debates on Europe, focusing on 
a need for “strong” member states. Most discussions on 
Hungary’s position in the EU have revolved around how 
Hungary can implement its interests. The EU is therefore 
chiefly seen as an arena for bargaining, which creates winners 
and losers, and less a forum for cooperation (Ágh 2016). Fidesz 
has successfully promoted the understanding of EU member-
ship as a loss of national sovereignty, using this to discredit the 
more internationalist attitudes of its domestic political rivals 
(Matthes 2016). However, while Orbán frequently muses about 
“life outside of the EU” (Magyar Nemzet 2016), Fidesz has not 
entertained these notions seriously.
At the time of the British referendum, the Czech govern-
ment consisted of the center-left Czech Social Democratic 
Party (ČSSD), the centrist-populist ANO party, and the 
Christian Democrats, and was led by PM Bohuslav Sobotka 
(ČSSD). In June 2018, a new, minority coalition government, 
headed by Andrej Babiš, was sworn in. Babiš’s ANO party won 
the general election in October 2017 and entered into 
a coalition agreement with the ČSSD, also relying on the sup-
port of KSČM.
The Czech political context differs from the Hungarian one. 
ANO has a much less dominant position than Fidesz, and the 
level of democratic backsliding is much lower, not least because 
the country lacks a powerful narrative of Czech nationalism 
(Hanley and Vachudova 2018, 278) or the language of cultural 
or political exceptionalism (Brusis 2016; Havlík and Hloušek 
2021; Havlík and Voda 2018). ANO portrays itself a non- 
ideological citizens’ movement of practical “doers” (Hanley 
and Vachudova 2018, 281), with Babiš vowing to run the 
country like a successful firm (Dostál and Nič 2018, 2). 
Furthermore, Czech EU politics is “reactive, pragmatic, non- 
ideological, and very transactional” (Dostál and Nič 2018, 4). 
While more recent Czech EU discourses have been character-
ized by a predominantly critical tone, EU policy has been 
highly ambivalent, with the government accentuating the 
importance of the EU to the Czech Republic and considering 
EU membership a key pillar of its foreign (though not domes-
tic) policy (Hloušek and Kaniok 2021). Babiš calls himself 
a pro-European politician and argues that membership in the 
EU “has no alternative” (Babiš 2018). In this context, he only 
“promotes views which he expects will earn him popularity 
with voters” (Borčany and Janebová 2019, 11), as typified, for 
instance, by his views on the EU migration crisis or climate 
change. Compounding this is ANO’s lack of a clearly defined 
EU policy, with the party suffering from a shortage of senior 
figures experienced in EU affairs (Dostál and Nič 2018, 4). This 
non-ideological, pragmatic approach to the EU explains why 
ANO is less inclined than Fidesz to embrace the notion of 
Brexit as a part of a Europe-wide national-populist revolt. 
Despite the change in the Czech government in 2018, there 
are reasons to expect consistency in the county’s framing of 
Table 1. Trade, Investment, and Migration between the UK and the Czech 
Republic/Hungary, 2016 (in Million USD, UK’s Position Among Top Export/ 
Import/Investment Partners in Parentheses).
Czech Republic Hungary
Goods exports to the UK 8,416 (4th) 4,026 (9th)
Goods imports from the UK 3,751 (8th) 1,769 (14th)
Stock of UK FDI 5,604 (8th) 3,046 (6th)
Expatriate population in the UK 40,000–100,000 100,000–250,000
Sources: World Bank WITS; OECD.stat, MZV (2018a) and Beke (2017).
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Brexit, as the general content of Czech foreign and EU policy 
has been marked by substantial continuity, even stagnation 
(Borčany and Janebová 2019, 9).
Further indicative of the country’s pragmatic approach to 
the EU is the fact that no parliamentary political party pro-
motes Czech withdrawal from the EU (“Czexit”), with the 
exception of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(SPD). This said, in the immediate wake of the British refer-
endum, calls for a referendum on the country’s EU member-
ship were also voiced by the euroskeptic president, Miloš 
Zeman. Zeman, who has no authority to call a referendum, 
declared that he would “do everything for [Czechs] to have 
a referendum and be able to express themselves” (John 2016). 
These suggestions were, however, rebuffed by the government.
These differences in domestic politics are likely to lead to 
different framings of Brexit in the two countries. Hungary takes 
an ideological position toward the EU and the country’s posi-
tion within it, and has consistently framed it a as threat to 
national sovereignty. Hungary has also had a highly confronta-
tional relationship with the EU, and it is therefore reasonable to 
expect that the government will channel Brexit into its existing 
approach toward integration. Politicians in the Czech 
Republic, however, are less ideological, and no party dominates 
the country’s politics to the degree that Fidesz does in 
Hungary. Czech framings of Brexit therefore may be much 
more pragmatic.
Methods for Frame Analysis
In order to examine how the three framing expectations play 
out in practice, we constructed a qualitative dataset of political 
speeches, interviews, and other statements from the Czech 
Republic and Hungary regarding Brexit, between the date of 
the Brexit referendum (June 23, 2016) and the date of the 
European Council’s endorsement of the withdrawal agreement 
(November 25, 2018). We aimed to systematically capture all 
the important government texts in order to ensure compar-
ability between the two countries. Data collection focused on 
the official government websites of the two countries (vlada.cz 
and kormany.hu), using the keywords Brexit, United 
Kingdom, and Great Britain. In the case of Hungary, kor-
many.hu includes the official websites of all line ministries. In 
the Czech Republic, the search on vlada.cz was further com-
plemented by searches on individual ministry websites. We 
only included texts that met three criteria: the text needed to 
feature a national-level government politician mentioning 
Brexit; Brexit had to be featured relatively significantly in the 
text; and only texts in Czech and Hungarian were included, 
given the focus on domestic framings.
In addition to government documents, a number of texts 
from opposition politicians were also collected from both 
countries. The purpose of this was not to give 
a comprehensive account of the views of the opposition, but 
rather to juxtapose these with government framings. The col-
lection of these statements used the same criteria as in the case 
of government texts, and focused on the websites of the main 
opposition parties: the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), 
Jobbik, and Politics Can Be Different (LMP) in Hungary; the 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Communist Party (KSČM), 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), and TOP09 in the 
Czech Republic.
We included in the analysis all the government and opposi-
tion texts that met our search criteria; their total numbers are 
shown in Table 2.
Our approach to analyzing the texts relies on frame analysis, 
“a particular causal-oriented and focused version of discourse 
analysis” (Lindekilde 2014, 222). Each text was coded with the 
goal of identifying the specific way in which Brexit was dis-
cussed. We opted for a data-driven process of coding, within 
which the frames emerge as the research progresses. Following 
the standard procedures for this outlined by Baldwin Van Gorp 
(2010, 94–97), the coding followed three (iterative) procedures. 
The first step involved open coding: each text was examined 
without a predefined coding instrument, with attention to the 
elements by which frames manifest themselves, namely pro-
blem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and 
treatment recommendation (Entman 1993, 52). The second 
step involved a higher level of abstraction and arranging the 
codes around “axes” of meaning and linking them to over-
arching frames. The third step included linking these frames to 
the three expectations outlined in the previous section (self- 
portrayal, apportioning blame, and opposition to EU reform), 
in a way to ensure that they are “mutually exclusive and each 
link is meaningful” (Van Gorp 2010, 96–97).
Framing Brexit
Self-Portrayal of Governments
The first expectation centers around frames of Brexit that 
portray governments as prepared defenders of the national 
interest. The analysis suggests that there is strong evidence of 
both governments framing Brexit in ways that portray them-
selves as capable actors. Defending the national interest is 
possibly the most important specific frame. The framings 
used by the opposition are consistent with our expectations 
only in the case of Hungary, where the opposition, while 
generally not engaging with Brexit, has used it on occasion to 
attack the government for its lack of actions.
Czech Republic
The Czech government clearly portrayed itself as the capable 
defender of the national interest.1 Framing of Brexit along the 
lines of Czech national interests dominated the Czech govern-
mental discourse on Brexit, with rhetoric focusing on the 
country’s preferences in the withdrawal process. This frame 
has been a constant and stable feature of Czech government 
discourse on Brexit, but gained strength particularly in the run- 
up to the October 2017 parliamentary elections. The promo-
tion of Czech interests has provided a robust contextualization 
Table 2. Number of Texts Used in the Analysis.
2016 2017 2018 Total
Czech Republic Government 35 31 46 112
Opposition 29 29 6 64
Hungary Government 35 51 45 131
Opposition 10 5 3 18
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factor for the government’s thinking on Brexit; government 
figures usually made sure to include an explicit reference to 
Czech priorities and interests (as in MZV 2017b).2
Czech interests in connection with Brexit have mainly 
revolved around the rights of Czech citizens in the UK and 
economic prosperity. Czech government figures have been very 
vocal in making it clear that Czech expatriates must retain their 
rights as regards health and benefits (Vláda 2016d). With up to 
100,000 Czech nationals resident in the UK (MZV 2018a), this 
line of reasoning resonated with domestic voters, and was 
politically useful as parliamentary elections approached 
(Brusenbauch Meislová 2018). Unlike officials in Hungary, 
Czech government figures invariably referred to Czech 
nationals in the UK as “Czech citizens.”
The government rhetoric on Czech economic interests 
included three key themes: ensuring that Czech access to the 
UK market and British investments in the Czech Republic are 
not undermined (MPO 2017; Vláda 2017d); that the UK settles 
all its financial commitments to the EU (MZV 2017c; Vláda 
2017d); and, given that the country is a net beneficiary of EU 
funding, concerns about the financial gap that the UK’s with-
drawal will leave in the EU budget (MF 2018; MZV 2018b). 
Additionally, less salient elements of framings around national 
interest referred to ensuring that the UK remains a close part-
ner in security and defense areas (MO 2016; Vláda 2017c); 
safeguarding an “orderly” Brexit (Vláda 2018a); and avoiding 
a no- deal scenario (Vláda 2018c). By contrast, the avoidance of 
a hard border in Ireland carried only little salience with the 
Czech governing elite. Finally, the national interest frame also 
positioned the EU’s unified front on Brexit as clearly in the 
country’s interest, evidenced through the repeated employ-
ment of phrases such as “in the case of Brexit, the EU is strong 
and united” (Vláda 2018a) and “we are united and Michel 
Barnier enjoys our full confidence” (Vláda 2018b). This rela-
tively extensive focus on unity is in line with the country’s 
broader official approach toward the EU’s future, which 
emphasizes keeping the EU united.
National interests, and calling on the government to protect 
these, were important elements in the opposition’s framings of 
Brexit as well, especially in the discourse of ODS (2017b, 
2017d). Yet, unlike in Hungary, the Czech opposition did not 
explicitly accuse the government of failing to do so. The only 
exception seems to be ODS, which frequently disapproved of 
the lack of the Czech unity regarding the withdrawal negotia-
tions (ODS 2016c, 2017e). The SPD is an outlier among the 
Czech opposition parliamentary parties, inasmuch as it 
believes that Czech national interests vis-à-vis Brexit (or any 
other issue, for that matter) cannot be protected within the EU 
and has argued that the country should replicate the UK’s 
actions (SPD 2016e).
Hungary
The Hungarian government has also made significant fram-
ing efforts to show itself as prepared and determined 
regarding the Brexit process, as well as “strong” enough 
to implement the national interests. This frame emerged 
immediately after the referendum, and the early focus was 
on protecting the rights of Hungarian workers in the UK 
(Kormany.hu 2016c). The number of Hungarians resident 
in the UK is much larger than the Czech expatriate popula-
tion, and clearly represents a large constituency (Beke 
2017). Various government figures have emphasized that 
Hungary will be “tough and determined” in the negotia-
tions to ensure that the rights of Hungarians are not 
harmed (Kormany.hu 2016d). This “tough” stance aligns 
very closely with the Hungarian government’s broader 
rhetoric in foreign policy and vows to protect the country’s 
interests, ensuring that foreign powers do not harm 
Hungary. Some government figures even stated that 
Hungary’s entire approach to Brexit would be determined 
by how the issue of Hungarian workers was dealt with 
(Kormany.hu 2017a). Interestingly, the government almost 
always referred to Hungarians in the UK as “workers” and, 
especially in the rhetoric of Orbán, as “families” (Kormany. 
hu 2016e). The term “citizens” was rarely used, and 
“migrants,” or any other term that could be associated 
with migration, practically never: the government was 
keen to disassociate Hungarians working in other 
European countries from Asian or African arrivals to the 
continent. Protecting the rights of Hungarians remained 
a constant element in the government’s framing of Brexit 
throughout, even after the Joint Report in December 2017 
(Kormany.hu 2018b). After the finalization of the withdra-
wal agreement in November 2018, Orbán triumphantly 
reported that he had achieved the Hungarian government’s 
“main goal” of protecting the rights of Hungarians in the 
UK (Kormany.hu 2018c).
While this framing aligned with the government’s general 
rhetoric regarding the EU, it was also made necessary by the 
opposition’s heavily instrumental usage of Brexit. While 
Hungarian opposition parties seem to have engaged much 
less with Brexit than their Czech counterparts, potentially 
underlining the distant nature of the crisis, they did on occa-
sion use it to attack the government for its lack of action. MSZP 
claimed that the Orbán government had abandoned expatriate 
Hungarians and was only protecting their interests with “weak 
slogans” (MSZP 2017), while LMP argued that Fidesz does not 
care about Hungarians living in the UK (LMP 2018a). LMP 
even introduced a motion in parliament requiring the govern-
ment to publish a clear strategy on Brexit and on supporting 
Hungarians in the UK (LMP 2018b). While this was voted 
down by the government majority, the criticisms from the 
opposition may have compelled the government to emphasize 
its own determination even more strongly.3
As in the Czech Republic, the Hungarian government also 
portrayed itself as committed to protecting national economic 
interests. The Hungarian government’s rhetoric on economic 
relations after Brexit aimed to show that it had a clear idea of 
its preferences, and was willing to stand up for these. These 
preferences included ensuring free trade and investment 
between Hungary and the UK (Kormany.hu 2016d). Phrases 
like “frictionless trade” (Kormany.hu 2016f), or “maintaining 
close economic ties” (Kormany.hu 2016g), were common, 
and from early 2017 a “broad and comprehensive trade 
deal” became the main catchphrase (Kormany.hu 2017b). 
The government also began calling for a “fair” Brexit from 
early 2017 (Kormany.hu 2017d). This framing has a number 
of connotations not present in the Czech case. It not only 
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shows the Hungarian government as determined to protect 
national interests, but also portrays Hungary as being sympa-
thetic toward the UK’s interests, as opposed to the EU, which 
wanted to punish it for leaving, and thus moves into framings 
about apportioning blame, which are discussed in the next 
section. The more sporadic, national interest–related ele-
ments present in the Czech Republic are also evident in the 
self-portrayals of the Hungarian government: defense and 
security (Kormany.hu 2017h); avoiding a no-deal Brexit 
(Kormany.hu 2018e); and ensuring the unity of the EU 
(Kormany.hu 2018f).
Apportioning Blame on the EU
Both governments are expected to frame Brexit in ways that 
apportion blame on the EU. Due to its preexisting conflicts 
with the EU, we expect such framing to be stronger in 
Hungary. In line with these expectations, we find considerable 
evidence that the Czech government was rather restrained in 
using Brexit to apportion blame on the EU, unlike some oppo-
sition actors. The Hungarian government, however, used these 
framings extensively, drawing parallels between how Hungary 
and the UK are treated by the EU.
Czech Republic
The Czech government has criticized the EU (and EC president 
Jean-Claude Juncker in particular) for significantly contribut-
ing to the referendum result. This framing is apparent in the 
rhetoric of individual ministers (especially foreign affairs min-
ister Lubomir Zaorálek, Andrej Babiš when he was finance 
minister, and defense minister Martin Stropnický), but never 
in the case of prime ministers, who have generally opted for 
a more conciliatory tone. To provide a few examples, Zaorálek 
proclaimed that the EU “did very little to persuade the British 
to remain” (MZV 2016c), and that Brexit was “a very bad 
school report for the Union” (MZV 2016b). In the same spirit, 
a narrative invoked by Babiš was that the victory of the Leave 
vote was “solely a result of the failure of EU leaders who 
‘pushed Britain into a corner’” (MF 2016). Likewise, 
Stropnický averred that he did not “recall President Juncker 
backing PM Cameron in any way in his efforts to persuade 
British voters to remain” (MO 2016a), and that he was “at least 
partly responsible for the negative referendum result” (MO 
2016b). Out of all the frames embedded in the Czech govern-
ment’s discourse on Brexit, blaming the EU invites the most 
moral judgments with the use of emotionally charged language 
(“pushed into a corner,” “offended,” “failure”). This rhetoric 
was clearly discernible in the government’s discourse in the 
immediate wake of the referendum and was prominent until 
the end of summer 2016. It was later subdued, however, and 
the government never criticized the EU’s approach toward the 
negotiations as such.
Adding to the strength of this frame has been a certain 
degree of sympathy with the UK and its interests, typified by 
PM Babiš’s statement in September 2018 that he felt “sorry” for 
the UK, or Zaorálek’s remark that “the British discontent with 
the EU can be understood” (MZV 2016b). From the Czech 
point of view (and especially immediately after the referen-
dum), it was the UK, rather than the EU, that was facing “great 
worries” (Vláda ČR 2016a). However, such statements never 
became dominant.
Czech opposition actors have perhaps framed Brexit as 
a fault of the EU even more strongly than the government. 
The opposition employed blame appropriation to create 
a stronger image of Brexit as a preventable crisis and used it 
to attack EU leaders ad hominem (especially Juncker). The 
SPD and KSČM (and to a lesser extent, ODS) have especially 
laid blame on the EU for Brexit and the state of Article 50 
negotiations, with their discourse conveying an image of the 
EU as an inefficient, detached, elitist actor that knowingly 
contributed to creating Brexit. According to the KSČM, the 
EU is characterized by “senseless quotas, vulgar diktat, absurd 
orders, ill-considered prohibitions and regulations” (KSČM 
2016c); is “barbarously anti-democratic” (KSČM 2016b); and 
“makes a mess of everything it touches” (KSČM 2016a). The 
SPD argued that Brexit is the victory of “common sense” (SPD 
2016a), “freedom and direct democracy” (SPD 2016b) over the 
oppressive, unresponsive, and bureaucratic EU. ODS por-
trayed the EU’s mismanagement of the migration crisis as the 
major cause of Brexit (ODS 2016b).
Hungary
As expected, the Hungarian government framed Brexit with 
the goal of apportioning blame on the EU much more 
strongly than the Czech government did. The framing around 
the need for Brexit to be “fair” is an example of this. While 
this term is fuzzy, some elements are clear: Brexit should be 
beneficial for both the UK and the EU, balancing rights and 
obligations for both parties, and focusing on identifying pos-
sibilities for mutual economic wins (Kormany.hu 2017f, 
2017g). The EU should not act as the offended party 
(Kormany.hu 2017b), and according to Orbán it should 
“stand on the ground of common sense” (Kormany.hu 
2017e). This insinuates that the EU is behaving less maturely 
than expected. “Fair Brexit” serves a purpose for domestic 
audiences, and fits into the government’s wider discourse on 
Hungary’s relationship with the EU. It shows sympathy 
toward a state that stood up against the EU and is now 
suffering the consequences. This strengthens government 
rhetoric about how the Brussels elite aims to punish member 
states that go against it; the parallels with how the govern-
ment portrays the EU’s approach toward Hungary are unmis-
sable, and sometimes even mentioned explicitly (Kormany.hu 
2017b). The EU is seen as a vengeful negotiator pursuing 
unfair solutions, implying that standing up against this irra-
tional bully is the “right” way to act.
Brexit has also been framed to argue how dysfunctional the 
EU is, and was routinely used as a tool to attack it. Most 
importantly, Brexit was employed to criticize the EU’s 
approach to migration. As stated by foreign affairs minister 
Péter Szijjártó, “a key lesson from Brexit is that we need to end 
Brussels’s pro-migration policies, which jeopardize the unity of 
the EU” (Kormany.hu 2016c). Claims were made by 
Hungarian politicians that Brussels’s management of “illegal 
migration” was a key factor affecting the Brexit vote (Kormany. 
hu 2016h). Brexit was also a failure of the EU for not listening 
to “the people” (Kormany.hu 2016i), and a consequence of the 
EU’s being unable to solve its own problems, including 
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migration, economic decline, terrorism, and declining compe-
titiveness (Kormany.hu 2016j).
Blame apportionment seems to have been used for domestic 
purposes, justifying how the government was right in its 
approach to confronting the EU. As stated by Orbán: “the 
British have said that things are not going well in the EU, and 
they will leave. We also have to think about what is not going 
well in the EU” (Kormany.hu 2016k). The rhetoric of blaming 
Brexit on the EU was especially dominant in the run-up to the 
government’s referendum on the EU’s refugee reallocation 
scheme in October 2016, but made periodic appearances later 
on as well. For example, in mid-2018, Brexit was used to attack 
specific EU politicians, especially in the wake of the Sargentini 
report. This report, adopted by the European Parliament in 
September 2018, heavily condemned the undemocratic prac-
tices of the Hungarian government. In response, Hungarian 
government rhetoric attacked the credibility of EU leaders, 
who should have resigned after the Brexit vote (Kormany.hu 
2018g). Orbán specifically stated in November 2018 that elect-
ing Juncker as EC president, a candidate opposed by both 
Hungary and the UK, was a mistake that contributed to 
Brexit (Kormany.hu 2018h).
Using Brexit to juxtapose “the people” and the unelected 
Brussels elite, a common argument made by populist politi-
cians, fits with the Hungarian government’s view of integra-
tion. In this sense, Brexit is portrayed as a failure of the elite-led 
federalist EU project and an indication of the need to reform 
the EU in a direction that gives nations greater power.4
Given such strong blame apportionment from the govern-
ment, it is unsurprising that the Hungarian opposition made 
little use of these framings. Even the extreme right Jobbik party 
was relatively restrained, and while some blame was placed on 
the EU for having become a “centralized dictatorship” (Jobbik 
2016a), these voices were relatively rare.
Opposing EU Reform?
Despite apportioning blame on the EU, the expectation is that 
the Czech Republic and Hungary will actually favor maintain-
ing the status quo, given their beneficial status. Contrary to this 
expectation, however, the data reveal seemingly strong calls for 
EU reform in both countries.
Czech Republic
The Czech government’s discourse on Brexit interprets the 
UK’s decision to leave the bloc as a signal of the “need” for 
EU reform (MF 2016; Vláda 2017b). This frame was most 
commonly used throughout 2016 and early 2017, but became 
less prevalent later on. The links between Brexit and EU reform 
in the government’s thinking are shown by the fact that the 
official name of the Government Office’s Brexit working group 
was Working Group for Brexit and EU Reform. Yet, even 
though Czech politicians expressed various ideas about how 
the EU might be changed, in the context of Brexit their rhetoric 
on EU reform was very broad-based, superficial, and vague. 
Czech government figures have emphasized that, because of 
Brexit, the EU must be reformed in order to “increase citizens’ 
confidence in European cooperation” (Vláda 2016b), to 
“increase the EU’s capacity for action and its ability to solve 
specific problems of our people” (Vláda 2017b), and to make 
decisions “more effectively and more quickly” (MZV 2017a). 
At the same time, however, they firmly opposed ceding further 
powers to the EU and treaty changes. Furthermore, true to its 
long-term transactional view of the EU, epitomized recently by 
its membership of the Friends of Cohesion club, the Czech 
Republic has been keen to emphasize the Brexit budget hole of 
“roughly 11 billion euro by 2021” (Vláda 2018d), sharply 
objecting to any Brexit-induced decrease of the EU cohesion 
allocation.
The frame of post-Brexit EU reform is foregrounded also by 
the opposition, which argued that Brexit had triggered discus-
sion on EU reform, possibly in the direction of a “multi-speed 
Europe” with a differentiated approach to integration (appar-
ent especially in the discourses of TOP09 [2017b] and ODS 
[2016a, 2017a]). The exact details of how the EU should be 
reformed in the wake of Brexit, however, are even vaguer than 
in case of the government, with the opposition proposing 
“more space for individual national parliaments and their 
interests” (KSČM 2018; ODS 2017c), and claiming “what is 
needed is not just different forms of cooperation, but a different 
type of civilization” (KSČM 2018). Pro-EU TOP09 is the only 
Czech political party that calls for the country to belong to the 
EU core and to initiate debate on joining the single currency 
(TOP09 2017a). However, the SPD, and to a lesser extent the 
KSČM, foreground EU unreformability, emphasizing a lack of 
courage and political will on the part of, particularly, the EC, 
which is described as incapable of any reforms, let alone self- 
reforms (SPD 2016d).
These framings of Brexit around EU reform correspond 
with the wider trends of the Czech discussion on the future 
of the EU, which has been mostly couched in broad, vague 
terms and characterized by reactivity and defensiveness. 
Indeed, deeper, constructive proposals for EU reform have 
been largely neglected by Czech leaders (Borčany and Dostál 
2018, 23), with the country tending to respond only to sugges-
tions formulated elsewhere. As such, it has “not been able to 
present a consistent and realistic vision for the Czech 
Republic’s place in the EU” (Borčany and Janebová 2019, 19). 
The elite Brexit-related attitudes to EU reform are thus well in 
line with the country’s general preference for pragmatic, ad hoc 
solutions when it comes to its engagement in EU 
policymaking.
Hungary
Calls for EU reform in Hungary have also been present, and 
similarly vague. As stated by Orbán in September 2016, “Brexit 
is an excellent opportunity for us [the leaders of the EU] to face 
our mistakes and weaknesses, and provides a sense of urgent 
need for correcting these mistakes” (Kormany.hu 2016l). 
According to Orbán, Brexit shows that further integration 
between nation states is no longer possible (Kormany.hu 
2016b). This global shift toward greater nationalism and illib-
eral politics has been a crucial element of Orbán’s world view, 
and Brexit fits into it well. However, most of the government 
framing on the EU’s failings focuses on attacking the EU with 
little constructive substance. Any calls for reforms in these 
frames were general and vague. For example, Hungarian offi-
cials argued that Brexit “poses an enormous challenge” for the 
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future of the EU (Kormany.hu 2018i), as it has shown that 
strengthening the EU (i.e., the EC) at the expense of member 
states is a dead end (Kormany.hu 2016m). The EU should now 
focus more on the “security of European people” (Kormany.hu 
2016n). What exactly this would mean in practice, however, 
was never elaborated, and the government did not put any 
detailed proposals forward. Most of Orbán’s speeches regard-
ing the EU’s future simply repeated the mantras related to 
migration and sovereignty, and lacked details (Kormany.hu 
2017g). Such a lack of detailed proposals questions just how 
serious the government was about reforming the EU.
In fact, there have been a number of calls for maintaining 
the status quo in some policy areas: the Hungarian government 
was clearly against any reforms that would hurt its access to EU 
structural and cohesion funding. According to Szijjártó: “it is 
not our fault that the British decided to leave, so the EU cannot 
punish Hungary by decreasing cohesion and structural fund-
ing” (Kormany.hu 2017i). The EU is thus blamed not only for 
Brexit, but also for decreasing funding possibilities.
Other than Jobbik’s calls for greater sovereignty for nation 
states (Jobbik 2016a), or even welcoming the “historic oppor-
tunity” to end the federalist EU project and create a “Europe of 
nations” (Jobbik 2016b), which resonate well with those of the 
government, Hungarian opposition parties were silent on the 
kind of Europe they would like to see after Brexit. MSZP 
politicians have talked about the need for “an EU that works 
better” due to stronger solidarity and deeper integration 
(MSZP 2016); however, they have failed to put forward 
a positive image of the EU’s future, and especially Hungary’s 
role in it. While the EU has often been portrayed in the 
discourses of the left as “indispensable” for Hungary’s future 
prosperity, the opposition did not seize the opportunity pro-
vided by Brexit to show why this is the case. While funding 
from the EU has been seen by all as an important benefit for 
Hungary, the opposition increasingly framed this negatively as 
a fuel for government corruption (see e.g. MSZP 2018). There 
has been little discussion on how “deeper integration” could 
benefit Hungary. While there have been references in the past 
to solving the collective challenges facing the EU (MSZP 2013), 
it is often unclear what these are, or indeed why they matter for 
a small country like Hungary. This passivity from the opposi-
tion means that the government has dominated the national 
preference-formation process about the EU with its negative 
framings of Brexit and the EU more broadly, and its message 
that only “strong and sovereign” member states can solve 
challenges. The dominance of these messages will have long- 
term consequences for the Hungarian public’s attitude toward 
integration.
Conclusions
The paper analyzed the crisis-exploitation framings of two EU 
member state governments, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
focusing on Brexit as a distant crisis and examining three 
expectations. The first expectation, focusing on how the 
Czech and Hungarian governments exploit Brexit to portray 
themselves as prepared and knowledgeable actors, was con-
firmed, with both governments using the crisis to convey the 
message that they are determined defenders of national 
interests. Second, we expected blame apportioning toward the 
EU to be present in Hungary but less so in the Czech Republic, 
which has a less conflictual relationship with the EU. These 
framings were present in both countries, but Hungarian gov-
ernment actors engaged more heavily in such rhetoric, using 
Brexit instrumentally for domestic political purposes by criti-
cizing the EU for its failures in managing the refugee crisis. The 
Hungarian government’s framing of Brexit also included 
a higher degree of moral judgment and was more ideologically 
charged, as epitomized by the “fair Brexit” frame. Third, our 
initial expectation on the governments’ framing of Brexit to 
argue for maintaining EU business as usual was only partially 
confirmed. While there were vague calls for EU reform in both 
countries, neither of them used the opportunity to construc-
tively argue for it.
These results point to the instrumentalization of Brexit as 
a distant crisis for internal political purposes, with the Czech 
and Hungarian governments exploiting it to justify their 
approaches to both domestic and EU politics. In this sense, 
Brexit, recontextualized within EU27 domestic politics, carries 
a specific political function, and its framing is neither arbitrary 
nor capricious, but deliberate and intentional. Indeed, both 
governments pragmatically adapted their discursive positions 
on Brexit on the grounds of their political calculus on both 
domestic and European questions. As evidenced in the paper, 
a distant crisis can be exploited with the goal of legitimizing the 
government’s actions, and in this case, anti-EU, pro- 
sovereignty rhetoric. Indeed, even though both governments 
officially endorsed and complied with the EU’s official Brexit 
position, they did not refrain from apportioning Brexit-related 
blame on the EU (if to varying degrees), or even questioning 
some of its decisions. Also, as the two cases have demonstrated, 
formal calls for EU reform, prompted by a distant crisis, do not 
necessarily mean that the governments really would like to 
challenge the status quo.
These conclusions also provide lessons for “distant crisis” 
as an analytical concept. The theoretical contribution of the 
paper is the extension of the crisis-exploitation framework to 
cover such distant crisis events. We argue that a distant crisis 
has two key features that differentiate it from the kinds of 
crises covered by Boin et al. (2009): its external origins and 
uncertain, indirect, and not immediate domestic impacts. Our 
paper showed that a distant crisis leads to different framing 
opportunities for political actors as opposed to the ones gen-
erally featured in the crisis-framing literature (De Vries 2014; 
Masters and ’t Hart 2012; McCann 2013), especially in terms 
of the incentives to apportion blame on external versus 
domestic adversaries, and the utilization of crisis to call for 
change. Although further research will be required to sub-
stantiate this with evidence from other cases, the exploitation 
of Brexit in the Czech Republic and Hungary shows that 
political actors instrumentalize distant crises for domestic 
political purposes, intentionally selecting and highlighting 
some features of reality while omitting and obscuring others 
(cf. Dean 2009, 41). While the contours of this framing 
manipulation crucially depend on the domestic context, pub-
lic framings are not really about the crisis itself (and/or 
a diagnosis of its causes and effects), but about using the 
crisis as an example, or an excuse, to promote other political 
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goals. A distant crisis thus creates a political opportunity and 
is exploited, but not necessarily to justify or call for action 
related to the crisis. Especially in the case of Hungary, Brexit 
was molded and framed to fit into the government’s existing 
world view. The way a distant crisis is framed and discursively 
(re)presented may therefore reveal existing political prefer-
ences of the government and opposition.
Notes
1. This rhetoric was not in line with the actual state of the Czech 
administration’s preparations for Brexit, which were slow and 
unsystematic, with the government repeatedly emphasizing that it 
is the responsibility of companies and individuals to prepare.
2. References to Czech and Hungarian government and opposition 
sources are listed in an online appendix available at https://doi:10. 
1080/10758216.2021.1915162. 
3. As in the Czech case, actual official preparations for Brexit were 
sporadic at best in Hungary, and did not go beyond providing 
advice to citizens and companies.
4. This rhetoric of blaming the EU is similar to what the Hungarian 
government did during and after the 2015 migration crisis. 
Although the government’s framing of migration was very differ-
ent than that of Brexit, portraying it as an immediate national 
security threat (Bocskor 2018; Cantat and Rajaram 2019), it was 
instrumentalized in very similar ways to attack the EU for its 
perceived failings and the unfair way in which it treats certain 
member states.
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